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{ i {1. Introduction
Julius Caesar once famously claimed that he would rather be the ¯rst in command in a
village than the second in Rome. Presumably for him, having the authority over all but
a single individual in the great city of Rome is less satisfying than being second to none
in a small village. Caesar's claim underscores the commonplace concerns for both the
\peer e®ect" and the \pecking order e®ect" when it comes to making mutually exclusive
choices of which jobs to take, which schools to attend, or which social clubs to join. The
two concerns coexist because interactions among individuals in an organization typically
involve both cooperation and competition.
The peer e®ect is well-documented in the education literature (e.g., Coleman et al.,
1966; Summers and Wolfe, 1977; Sacerdote 2001). Lazear (2001) has a model of educational
technology in which the peer e®ect arises because learning is reduced for all other students
when one student disrupts the class. More generally, the peer e®ect is seen as a consequence
of the complementarity between characteristics of agents in a match. Naturally, people
desire to join organizations with high-quality members if being in the company of high-
quality colleagues raises their own utility or productivity. But the motive to join the
company of high-quality peers can also be present without complementarity. For example,
potential employers' imperfect information about individual student quality leads to their
use of the school average to improve on their estimate, as described in the statistical
discrimination literature (e.g., Aigner and Cain, 1977). High-quality peers can therefore
confer an informational externality on one another.
The pecking order e®ect is related to people's concern for their relative status. It can
arise from the e®ects on self-esteem developed through interactions with other agents in
an organization. The idea that an individual's utility depends not only on the level of his
consumption, but also on how that level compares with that of his reference group, has
a long history in economics (e.g., Duesenberry, 1949; Frank, 1985; Solnick and Hemen-
way, 1998). In educational psychology, researchers speak of a \big ¯sh{small pond" e®ect
(Marsh and Parker, 1984). A study of academically talented students in Israeli primary
schools ¯nds that those who participate in special homogeneous classes for the gifted have
{ 1 {lower academic self-concept and greater test anxiety than do those who participate in regu-
lar mixed-ability classes (Zeidner and Schleyer, 1998). In a longitudinal study of secondary
school students in Hong Kong, which has a highly achievement-segregated school system,
Marsh et al. (2000) ¯nd that school-average ability has a negative e®ect on a student's
academic self-concept, and that lower academic self-concept in turn adversely a®ects a
student's subsequent academic achievement as re°ected in standardized test scores.1
Without denying the importance of social-psychological factors such as self-esteem,
the pecking order e®ect can also arise when some resources within a group or an organi-
zation are allocated through non-market means. Cole et al. (1992) describe a model in
which the competition for mates leads to a concern for relative ranking. As Postlewaite
(1998) points out, such kind of non-market allocation is ubiquitous. Resources within an
organization such as corner o±ces or decision making power in recruitment are often allo-
cated according to the relative status of the incumbents. Furthermore, people higher up in
the pecking order have a greater chance of success in internal promotion tournaments. In
school choices, the pecking order e®ect is present because grades are relative and depend
on underlying abilities of fellow students. It is more important when grades have more
serious implications, as demonstrated by the so-called top-ten-percent law in the state of
Texas, which guarantees that students who ¯nish in the top ten percent of their graduating
class earn automatic admission to the Texas public university of their choice (The New
York Times, April 14, 2002).
Even men as great as Julius Caesar at some point might not be able to have it both
ways. The rest of us are constantly reminded by the trade-o® between the peer e®ect and
the pecking order e®ect. Because the groups or organizations we are trying to join have
limited capacities, individuals who are most desirable are expected to make any choice as
they wish, while those who are least desirable have no real choice. It may thus appear
that the sorting choices can be determined sequentially, with the more desirable agents
choosing before the less desirable ones. But generally those ranked at the bottom of the
1 These researchers also ¯nd that higher perceived school status has a counterbalancing positive e®ect
on self-concept. This is consistent with the informational externality we discuss in connection with the
peer e®ect.
{ 2 {¯rst-tier organization will want to switch to the top of the second-tier one. Sorting choices
cannot be determined independently because for each agent both the peer e®ect and the
pecking order e®ect in an organization depend on the choices made by other agents.
This paper presents a model where agents with heterogeneous, one-dimensional type
face the trade-o® between the peer e®ect and the pecking order e®ect in choosing between
two organizations of ¯xed sizes. We de¯ne a \priority equilibrium" as an allocation of
types among the organizations such that no agent whose type is higher than the lowest
type in the other organization wishes to move. Sorting of agents is shown to result in
an overlapping interval structure in the type space: the set of types that end up in each
organization is an interval, and both the highest type and the lowest type are higher in
the organization with a higher average type.
It is well known that complementarity in the production function can lead to a com-
plete segregation of workers by their abilities (e.g., Becker 1973; Benabou 1993; Kremer
1993). In our model the presence of the pecking order e®ect moderates this tendency. Seg-
regation and mixing typically coexist in the distribution of talents among organizations.
For example, top ranked economists are exclusive to best research departments but at the
same time second-tier departments often have economists who can easily make a successful
career in any ¯rst-tier department. Our model establishes the coexistence as a result of
equilibrium sorting by economists who prefer to have great colleagues but recognize that
the more productive researchers within individual departments have greater access to de-
partmental resources. Further, the equilibrium overlapping-interval pattern of segregation
and mixing is locally stable, so that small perturbations in agents' organization choices are
self-correcting instead of self-ful¯lling.
In our model the degree of segregation, measured in terms of di®erences in quality
across organizations, increases as the concern for relative ranking becomes less important.
In the context of school choice, this result suggests that a greater degree of egalitarianism
within schools can lead to greater segregation by ability across schools. The model also
sheds light on organizational strategies that may be used to attract talent. In a priority
equilibrium with an overlapping interval structure, competition is most intense for agents
with intermediate ability, because they are mobile across organizations. This suggests that
{ 3 {a high-quality organization should adopt policies that cater more to its low-status members
(who have intermediate ability) than to its high-status members, since the star agents have
no better alternative than to stay. At the same time, the low-quality organization should
adopt policies that cater more to its high-status members (who have intermediate ability)
than to its low-status members, since the bottom agents have no real alternative but to
stay. To the extent that organizations can manipulate the pecking order e®ect to improve
the average quality of their incumbents, the results of our model will have interesting
implications for the design of personnel policies.
Our characterization of equilibrium sorting and comparative statics analysis are based
on a non-transferable utility model. In one interpretation of the model, complementarities
exist between the agent type, and both the agent's relative position in an organization
and the average type of that organization. When transfers are allowed and agents bid
competitively for positions of di®erent ranking in the organizations, we show that our stable
priority equilibrium can be supported as a competitive equilibrium with price schedules
for positions in di®erent organizations. This is because the complementarity between the
agent type and the relative position allows higher type agents outbid lower types for higher-
ranked positions in a competitive equilibrium, thus justifying our intuitive assumption that
in a priority equilibrium a switch from one organization to another is possible only for the
types that are higher than the lowest type in the latter organization. It turns out that
this competitive equilibrium allocation does not maximize aggregate utility. When agents
choose among organizations they do not internalize the peer e®ects on other agents, while
the external e®ects on the pecking order average out across organizations. As a result,
the competitive equilibrium allocation exhibits too little segregation. Under a linearity
assumption on the form of complementarities between the agent type and the concerns for
average quality and relative position, we show that maximizing aggregate utility requires
sorting types into overlapping intervals as in the priority equilibrium, and fully characterize
the e±cient allocation.
In the remainder of this section we review the existing literature that is most germane
to the present study. In Section 2, we present the basic model where agents with identi-
cal trade-o® between average quality and relative ranking sort into two ex ante identical,
{ 4 {equal-sized organizations. We show that all equilibria take the form of overlapping inter-
vals. We de¯ne stable equilibrium and show that a unique stable equilibrium exists for any
trade-o® between average quality and relative ranking. In Section 3, we o®er comparative
statics results regarding system-wide and organization-speci¯c factors that a®ect agents'
concern for relative ranking. We also examine the e®ect on equilibrium sorting of uniform
and idiosyncratic preference biases for organizations due to attributes independent of the
quality-ranking trade-o®. Section 4 introduces transfers and characterizes both the com-
petitive and the e±cient allocations. Section 5 concludes with a brief summary and a short
discussion of some limitations of the present paper.
1.1. Related literature
There is a rich literature on the impact of the peer e®ect on sorting. The issue of streaming
students by their ability has long been a controversial issue in education policy (e.g.,
Slavin 1987; Gamoran et al., 1995). One of the issues involved in this controversy is a
con°ict between e±ciency and egalitarianism. Education researchers typically attribute
the e±ciency of ability streaming to the fact that teachers can tailor their instruction to
a more homogeneous group of students (Lou et al., 2000). Economic theory suggests that
positive assortative matching maximizes the sum of outputs if the production function is
supermodular (Becker 1973). Lazear (1991) provides a micro-foundation for the existence
of the peer e®ect in the classroom, and discusses the implications of the peer e®ect for
streaming, class size, and other issues. Arnott and Rowse (1987) use a reduced-form
education production function with peer e®ects to derive the optimal allocation of students
and educational expenditure across classes. In the latter model, the extent of segregation
by ability is limited by diminishing returns to educational expenditure.
In the literature on locational choices, De Bartolome (1990) develops a community
choice model where families care about the provision of a public service (schooling) in the
community. Families have high or low ability children. High ability children bene¯t more
from expenditures on education (input e®ect) and all children bene¯t from having more
high ability children in the school (peer e®ect). Segregation occurs with only input e®ect
or peer e®ect, and when both e®ects are present mixed schools may obtain in equilibrium.
{ 5 {The focus of that paper is on e±ciency of school ¯nancing. Fernandez and Rogerson (1996)
study a similar model but without the peer e®ect, and focus on welfare improving policies.
They ¯nd that policies that increase the fraction of relatively wealthy individuals in the
poorest neighborhood make everybody better o®. In Epple and Romano (1998), students
di®er by ability and income and care about who their classmates are. Pro¯t-maximizing
private schools compete against each other and against a free public school by charging
tuition according to the type of each student who enrolls.2 Their equilibrium has a segre-
gated structure (i.e., no two schools enroll the same student type), and within each private
school rich low-ability students subsidize poor high-ability ones. Becker and Murphy (2000,
chap. 5) discuss the implications of the peer e®ect for residential segregation. They use a
two-type model to illustrate how multiple equilibria, tipping, and ine±ciency may arise in
a competitive land market when people prefer to have \good" neighbors.
Kremer and Maskin (1996) study a one-sided matching model with a production
function in which the more able worker within a two-person ¯rm gets to perform the
more productive task.3 Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004) study how specialization and
communication a®ect the equilibrium allocation of knowledge workers. By making the al-
location of job positions endogenous, these two models capture some aspect of the pecking
order e®ect. These models are particularly useful for analyzing earnings inequality, but
they do not yield easily interpretable results concerning the degree of segregation by ability
across organizations. In our paper, we use a reduced-form approach to study the pecking
order e®ect, without committing to any speci¯c channel in which relative ranks matter|be
it due to social psychological factors such as self-esteem, to non-market means of distribut-
ing resources within organizations, or to particular forms of production technologies. This
approach allows us to develop a °exible model that yields unambiguous results concerning
the systematic di®erences between high-quality and low-quality organizations.
2 Epple and Romano (1998) assume that the type of agents is observable. Damiano and Li (2003)
consider a random pairwise matching model with one-dimensional types and characterize price competition
when type information is private.
3 Legros and Newman (2002) consider more general models and derive conditions for pairwise matching
to be positive assortative. Hartwick and Kanemoto (1984) analyze the formation of a hierarchy of groups
where each agent's utility from joining a group depends on a variable associated with the group and a
value associated with the agent's rank within the group. There is no mixing in their equilibrium because
the variable associated with the group depends only on a boundary type.
{ 6 {2. The Basic Model
There is a mass of 2 of agents to be allocated into two organizations, A and B. For
simplicity, suppose that the organizations have the same size of 1. Agents are characterized
by their one-dimensional type µ. The distribution of µ is given by the distribution function
F on the support [µ;µ], with the corresponding density function f. We assume that f is
continuous.
Preferences of agents over the two organizations depend on the average type of agents
in that organization, and on their individual ranking within that organization.4 For each
i = A;B, let mi be the average type of agents in organization i. Let ri(µ) be the quan-
tile rank of an agent of type µ in organization i. Assume that the utility from joining
organization i is given by
(1) Vi(µ) = ®ri(µ) + mi;
where ® is a positive weight that agents put on ranking relative to organization quality.5
The payo® is zero if an agent does not join either organization.
Equation (1) embeds three assumptions about the individual utility function. First,
the concern for ranking and the concern for organization quality are additively separable;
second, the marginal rate of substitution between relative rank and average quality is type-
independent; third, the marginal rate of substitution is constant. These assumptions allow
us to characterize equilibrium pattern of sorting in a convenient way. We will comment
on the role played by these assumptions in the analysis below. Some of our results apply
to the more general case in which the marginal rate of substitution is type-independent
4 Peer e®ects work through many channels, and we only consider the simplest formulation in this
paper. If individuals prefer more homogeneous organizations, for example, then second moments would
also enter into their preferences. One may also imagine more complicated models in which, say, the upper
part of the distribution has a greater weight than the lower part because of the bene¯cial e®ects of role
models.
5 We assume that preferences are continuous in rank. In many organizations, there may be a dis-
continuous payo® from being at the top. But since there is some uncertainty regarding which member
of the organization will eventually end up being the top person, preferences will be continuous in the
ex ante ability ranking. A similar remark also applies to the pecking order e®ect induced by the Texas
top-ten-percent law.
{ 7 {but relative rank and average quality are not necessarily perfect substitutes. This case is
represented by the individual utility function
(2) Vi(µ) = v(ri(µ);mi);
where v is increasing in both arguments and di®erentiable.
Equation (1) is the simplest functional form that satis¯es the property that all agents
face identical, constant trade-o® between relative ranking and average quality. A more
general form that retains this property allows interactions between types and the concerns
for ranking and average quality, so that the utility function takes the multiplicatively
separable form,
(3) Vi(µ) = l(µ)(®ri + mi);
for some non-negative, non-decreasing and di®erentiable function l. When there are no
side transfers, equilibrium sorting is identical under equation (1) or (3); without loss of
generality we carry out the analysis under equation (1). When utility is transferable, the
form of l matters. In Section 5, we provide a more detailed discussion of equation (3) and
use it to characterize competitive and e±cient allocations.
2.1. Overlapping intervals
A feasible allocation in this model is a pair (HA;HB) of cumulative type distributions
in organizations A and B such that HA(µ) + HB(µ) = F(µ) for all µ 2 [µ;µ]. For each
i;j = A;B, i 6= j, when Hi(µ) is constant in a neighborhood of some type µ, types around
µ are all allocated to organization j only. If both HA and HB are strictly increasing in
a neighborhood of µ, then types around µ are split between A and B. Let Ti be the
support set of organization i, de¯ned as the closure of the set types at which Hi is strictly
increasing. In words, the support set Ti is the set of types that do not exclusively choose
organization j.
We assume that an agent can join organization i, either when the capacity of the
organization is not yet ¯lled, or when the capacity is ¯lled but the agent's type is higher
{ 8 {than the lowest type of that organization. In either case, we say that such a move by
a type µ agent is a priority move. We introduce an equilibrium concept to capture the
idea that any agent with a priority move should not prefer changing organization. Since
the payo® from not joining an organization is zero, the capacity of each organization will
always be ¯lled, and it is su±cient to consider priority moves based on type. For the
following de¯nition, note that given a feasible allocation (HA;HB), the rank ri(µ) of type
µ in each organization i is well-de¯ned, and is equal to Hi(µ).
Definition 1. A priority equilibrium is a feasible allocation (HA;HB) such that for each
i;j = A;B, i 6= j, if µ 2 Ti and µ > inf Tj, then Vi(µ) ¸ Vj(µ).
This de¯nition of equilibrium is a simpli¯cation of reality. If agents have multi-
dimensional attributes, it is not straightforward to de¯ne higher types and lower types.
For example, an organization may hire workers who are less directly productive but who
provide role models to improve its human capital stock (Athey et al., 2000). Even when
agents can be unambiguously ranked on a single ability dimension, it is not always the case
that incumbents in an organization necessarily welcome newcomers who have high ability.
Our model is more likely to apply when entry into an organization is controlled by an out-
side decision maker who is primarily interested in maximizing the average quality of the
organization. In Section 5 we allow side transfers and show that any equilibrium allocation
according to De¯nition 1 can be supported as a competitive equilibrium where agents bid
for positions of di®erent ranking in organizations. Now we introduce a particularly simple
form of allocation.
Definition 2. A feasible allocation is of an overlapping interval form if there exist types
x;y, with x ¸ y, such that the two support sets are [y;µ] and [µ;x].
In an overlapping interval form, the support set Ti of each organization i is an interval.
There are two critical types x and y, with x ¸ y. All agents with type greater than x go to
one organization, say A. All agents with type lower than y go to the other organization.
Agents with type in the range [y;x] are present in both organizations. The following lemma
shows that all priority equilibrium allocations take the form of overlapping intervals.
{ 9 {Lemma 1. Any priority equilibrium allocation takes the overlapping interval form.
Proof. First we show that the support sets TA and TB are ordered in any priority
equilibrium: if mA ¸ mB, then supTA ¸ supTB and inf TA ¸ inf TB. Suppose supTA <
supTB. Then there is a type µ 2 TB such that rB(µ) < 1 and rA(µ) = 1. Since mA ¸ mB,
agents of type µ strictly prefer A. But switching to A is a priority move for type µ, a
contradiction. A similar argument establishes that inf TA ¸ inf TB.
Next we show that in any priority equilibrium the support set Ti of each organization
i, i = A;B, is an interval in the type space. Suppose not, and, without loss of generality,
suppose that TA is not an interval. Then there exist two types µ and ~ µ, with µ < ~ µ,
such that all types on the interval (µ; ~ µ) choose organization B exclusively while types in
small neighborhoods below µ and above ~ µ are in the support set of organization A. Then,
HA(µ) = HA(~ µ) and HB(µ) < HB(~ µ). Since it is a priority move for µ and ~ µ to switch
between A and B, both types must be indi®erent between the two organizations, or
®rA(µ) + mA = ®rB(µ) + mB;
®rA(~ µ) + mA = ®rB(~ µ) + mB:
The above two contradict each other (recall that ri(t) = Hi(t) in each i.) Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 contains two results: the support sets of the two organizations are ordered,
and there are no gaps in the two support sets. The ¯rst result depends only on the
assumption that the individual utility function Vi(µ) increases with ri(µ) and mi. The
second result of no gaps in the support sets depends on the assumption that the marginal
rate of substitution between relative ranking and average quality is type-independent in
the individual utility function. However, even if relative ranking and average quality are
imperfect substitutes as in equation (2), the contradiction argument for the no-gap result
in the proof of Lemma 1 goes through. Thus, neither additive separability of the pecking
order e®ect and the peer e®ect nor the constancy of the marginal rate of substitution is
necessary for the result of overlapping intervals.6
6 When the marginal rate of substitution depends on the type, there may be gaps in the support sets.
For example, if the parameter ® in equation (1) is replaced by a decreasing function of µ, so that higher
types are less concerned with the pecking order e®ect than lower types, then the support set of the higher
quality organization may have gaps (the other support set continues to be an interval).
{ 10 {While it has been recognized in the literature that positive complementarities lead
to assortative matching and negative complementarities tend to produce mixing, there
are few general results in the literature concerning the equilibrium allocation when both
elements are present. In principle, \mixing" can take a variety of forms and this can render
the analysis unwieldy.7 In our model, support sets contain no holes, and mixing takes the
special form of overlapping intervals, drastically simplifying the subsequent analysis.
2.2. Stable priority equilibrium
Fix an overlapping interval allocation. Without loss of generality, we assume that TA =
[y;µ] and TB = [µ;x]. The restrictions on HA and HB imposed by the overlapping interval
form are: (i) HA(µ) = 0 and HB(µ) = F(µ) for µ 2 [µ;y]; (ii) HA(µ) = F(µ) ¡ 1 and
HB(µ) = 1 for µ 2 [x;µ]; and (iii) HA(µ) and HB(µ) are strictly increasing for µ 2 (y;x). See
Figure 1 for an illustration. Note that feasibility of the allocation implies that x ¸ µe ¸ y,
where µe denotes the median type of agents in the population. There are two extreme
cases of overlapping interval allocations: if x = y = µe, we have a perfectly segregated
allocation; if x = µ and y = µ, and HA(µ) = HB(µ) = 1
2F(µ), we have a perfectly mixed
allocation.
If x > y in an overlapping interval allocation, all agents of type µ 2 [y;x] must be
indi®erent between organization A and organization B. Recall that ri(µ) = Hi(µ) for each
i = A;B. The indi®erence conditions for the threshold types x and y are
(4)
®(2 ¡ F(x)) = mA ¡ mB;
®F(y) = mA ¡ mB:
These two indi®erence conditions imply
(5) 2 ¡ F(x) = F(y):
7 In Kremer and Maskin (1996), workers with one-dimensional, heterogeneous types form pairwise
matches to produce. There are two tasks, \manager" and \assistant," in each matched pair, and the
production function is given by µ2~ µ, where µ is the manager's type and ~ µ is the assistant's type. When
types are distributed uniformly over a relatively narrow range, total output is maximized by dividing the
mass of workers into two equal-size overlapping intervals of types that are managers and of types that are
assistants, and matching them positive assortatively. However, when the type distribution has a su±ciently
large support, the set of types that are managers and the set of types that are assistants are no longer
intervals. This feature makes the analysis of the extent of segregation in Kremer and Maskin (1996) quite
intractable.











The above equation de¯nes a one-to-one relation between y and x, with x = µ implying
y = µ, and x = µe implying y = µe. For all µ between y and x, a similar indi®erence
condition holds:
(6) ®(HB(µ) ¡ HA(µ)) = mA ¡ mB:
Thus, the di®erence in ranking for any type µ between A and B is constant on the interval





0; if µ · y
1
2 (F(µ) ¡ F(y)); if y < µ · x
F(µ) ¡ 1; if x < µ · µ,
and HB(µ) = F(µ) ¡ HA(µ).
With the above results, an overlapping interval allocation can be characterized by a
single variable. It is more convenient to de¯ne an equilibrium in terms of the di®erence in
average types, mA ¡ mB. Denote z = mA ¡ mB. To be consistent with our assumption
that TA = [y;µ] and TB = [µ;x], we have z ¸ 0. The largest possible value of z is ¹e ¡¹
e,
where ¹e and ¹
e are the conditional mean above and below µe respectively. Given any
z 2 [0;¹e¡¹
e], we use equations (4) to de¯ne the threshold types x and y. Note that since
{ 12 {x ¸ µe ¸ y, equations (4) cannot be satis¯ed if z > ® (this occurs only if ® < ¹e ¡ ¹
e); in
this case we let x = y = µe, as all types prefer A to B but only types above µe have the





where HA(t) is given by equation (7). From the identity mA + mB = 2¹, where ¹ is the
unconditional mean of the type distribution F, we get a necessary and su±cient condition
for a priority equilibrium with quality di®erence z:
(8) D(z) ´ 2(mA(z) ¡ ¹) = z:
If there exists z 2 (0;®) such that (8) is satis¯ed, then we have a priority equilibrium
with partial overlapping, where the threshold types x and y satisfy µ < y < µe < x < µe
by equations (4). If equation (8) is satis¯ed by z = ¹e ¡ ¹
e, then we have a perfectly
segregated equilibrium allocation, with x = y = µe. Finally, since z = 0 implies x = µ and
y = µ by equations (4), and hence equation (8) is satis¯ed by z = 0, a perfectly mixed
allocation is always an equilibrium.
The equilibrium condition D(z) = z may admit more than one solution in z in the
range [0;¹e ¡ ¹
e]. However, some of these solutions may be \unstable" with respect
to small perturbations in the equilibrium allocation. Following the standard stability
concept, we say that a priority equilibrium z is stable if D0(z) < 1.8 We have the following
characterization result for the basic model.
Proposition 1. A unique stable priority equilibrium exists for any ®, and is (a) perfect
segregation if ® · ¹e ¡ ¹
e, (b) partial overlapping if ¹e ¡ ¹
e < ® < µ ¡ µ, and (c) perfect
mixing if ® ¸ µ ¡ µ.
Proof. We already know that D(0) = 0 for any ®. Further, using equations (4) and (8),





8 We adopt the convention that D0(0) and D0(¹e¡¹
e) are de¯ned by continuity, from above and from
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From equations (4), we know that x decreases and y increases with z, and thus D(z) is a
concave function. There are three cases; see Figure 2 for an illustration. (a) If ® · ¹e¡¹
e,
then D0(0) > 1 and x = y = µe for all z 2 [®;¹e ¡ ¹
e]. We have D0(¹e ¡ ¹
e) = 0, and
z = ¹e ¡ ¹
e is the only stable solution. (b) If ¹e ¡ ¹
e < ® < µ ¡ µ, then D0(0) > 1, and
D(¹e ¡¹
e) < ¹e ¡¹
e because x > µe > y when z = ¹e ¡¹
e from equation (4). There is a
unique interior stable solution to D(z) = z. (c) If ® ¸ µ ¡µ, then D0(0) · 1 and therefore
D(z) < z for all z > 0. The only solution to D(z) = z is z = 0, which is stable. Q.E.D.
The above proposition establishes the existence of a unique stable priority equilib-
rium in our model for any utility parameter ® and type distribution F. The uniqueness
part of the result is due to the assumption of linear individual utility function (equation
1), but the existence part can be easily extended to the case when relative ranking and
average quality are not perfect substitutes. As we have remarked about Lemma 1, when
the individual utility function is instead given by equation (2), the support sets remain
overlapping intervals. In general there will not be an even split of types that are allocated
to both organizations, but we can follow the same procedure as above to construct a stable
priority equilibrium.9
9 For any z in the permissible range of [0;¹e ¡ ¹
e], we can determine the threshold types x and y
{ 14 {Proposition 1 establishes that segregation and mixing generally coexist in equilibrium
allocations of types across organizations. Since there is no inherent di®erence between or-
ganization A and organization B, for any equilibrium in which mA > mB, there is another
equilibrium involving the same allocation but with the identities of A and B reversed.
Nevertheless, each equilibrium is locally stable in the sense that small disturbances to the
allocation do not spread. In our model, \tipping" does not occur unless there is a large
scale coordinated reallocation of individuals across organizations.
Since an agent of a higher type has more choices of organization than an agent of
a lower type, equilibrium utility increases with type. In a perfectly mixed equilibrium
allocation, the two organizations are identical and equilibrium utility increases at the rate
of ®f(µ). In a perfectly segregated equilibrium, equilibrium utility increases twice as fast,
at the rate of 2®f(µ) in both organizations, with a discontinuity at µ = µe since the median
type strictly prefers A to B. In a partially-overlapping allocation, equilibrium utility is
continuous at the cuto®s y and x, and increases at the rate of 2®f(µ) for the segregating
types in [µ;y) and (x;µ], and at the rate of ®f(µ) for the mixing types in [y;x]. Thus,
for any ¯xed type distribution, equilibrium utility is more sensitive to type for segregated
types. Inequality among agent types is more pronounced in a more segregated outcome.
3. Comparative Statics Analysis
The analysis leading to Proposition 1 shows that the equilibrium allocation can be reduced
to a single variable z, which in turn depends on the parameter ® and the distribution
function F. As the equilibrium value of z increases from 0 to ¹e ¡ ¹
e, the threshold type
x decreases from µ to µe and y increases from µ to µe. Thus, the equilibrium allocation
by v(F(x) ¡ 1;mA) = v(1;mB) and v(0;mA) = v(F(y);mB) respectively, while indi®erence conditions
v(HA(µ);mA) = v(HB(µ);mB) de¯ne the allocation (HA;HB) between y and x. A priority equilibrium
is then de¯ned as before, as a ¯xed-point of equation (8). A stable equilibrium always exists: either
D0(0) · 1, in which case perfect mixing (z = 0) is a stable priority equilibrium (because D(0) = 0), or
D0(0) > 1, in which case an interior stable equilibrium exists if D(¹e ¡¹
e) < ¹e ¡¹
e or otherwise perfect
segregation (z = ¹e ¡ ¹
e) is a stable equilibrium.
{ 15 {becomes more segregated both in terms of a greater quality di®erence between the two
organizations, and in terms of a smaller range of mixing.10
In this section, we consider comparative statics regarding the degree of segregation.
Part of this comparative statics analysis follows directly from the characterization of the
unique stable priority equilibrium in the previous section. In this case there is no ambi-
guity regarding how to measure the degree of segregation. In other cases we need to suit-
ably extend the main model, by generalizing the overlapping interval form of allocation.11
Throughout this section we will identify the degree of segregation with the equilibrium
average quality di®erence between the two organizations.
3.1. Egalitarianism and segregation
Suppose the pecking order e®ect increases, or the peer e®ect becomes less important. This
change is represented by a rise in ®. Then, according to Proposition 1, perfect segregation
becomes less likely to be the stable equilibrium while perfect mixing becomes more likely
to be the stable equilibrium. Furthermore, in an equilibrium with a partial overlapping of
support sets, equations (4) imply that the threshold type x increases and y decreases for
any ¯xed z, with more types evenly split between y and x. As a result, the whole function






(x ¡ y)(2 ¡ F(x)) < 0:
Thus the equilibrium z decreases. We state this result as a proposition.
Proposition 2. An increase in the weight of the pecking order e®ect relative to the peer
e®ect reduces the extent of segregation between two organizations.
10 Kremer and Maskin (1996) de¯ne a segregation index as the ratio of between-organization variance
to the sum of between-organization variance and within-organization variance. In our model, it can be
shown the between-organization variance decreases with x, and the within-organization variance increases
in x. Thus, the value of the Kremer-Maskin segregation index falls with x.
11 In an earlier version of the present paper, we also consider how the degree of segregation is a®ected
when the relative size of the two organizations changes, when higher types care less about the pecking
order e®ect, and when there are more than two organizations.
{ 16 {The above result can be generalized to the case where relative ranking and average
quality are not perfect substitutes in individual utility functions. As we have remarked on
Proposition 1, stable priority equilibria can be shown to exist when the individual utility
function is given by equation (2). At any such equilibrium with allocation (HA;HB) and
quality di®erence z, when @v(ri;mi)=@r increases at every ri and mi, the equilibrium
quality di®erence z decreases.12
Proposition 2 has a number of applications. Suppose, for example, that a school board
decides that all schools within its district adopt a more egalitarian approach to education.
This means that top students within a school receive less attention and fewer scholarships or
prizes, while students lower down the ladder of academic ability have greater access to the
limited opportunities that help make a valuable educational experience (e.g., representing
the school in external competitions). A more egalitarian policy can also be achieved by a
more compressed distribution of grades, so that outsiders cannot so easily distinguish the
top students from the bottom ones. Such a change in policy would lead to a fall in ®. As
the advantages from being at the top of a school diminishes, agents will compete harder
to enroll in the school with higher average student ability. Paradoxically, our analysis
suggests that a policy toward greater egalitarianism within an organization may lead to
an outcome with greater segregation across organizations.
In some professions, the peer e®ect comes from the fact that being associated with
high quality colleagues tends to enhance one's human capital formation. To the extent
that the pecking order e®ect arises from the consumption motive (e.g., self-esteem) while
the peer e®ect arises from the investment motive, younger workers are expected to have
a smaller relative weight ® than do older workers. Proposition 2 then suggests that the
12 A brief argument is as follows. The indi®erence conditions v(HA(µ);mA) = v(HB(µ);mB) in the











Note that mA ¸ mB and HA(µ) · HB(µ). Thus, when @v(r;m)=@r increases at every r and m (while
@v(r;m)=@m remains unchanged), organization B becomes more attractive for each type µ. Since v is an
increasing function of r, to restore the indi®erence condition v(HA(µ);mA) = v(HB(µ);mB), we need to
increase HA(µ) and decrease HB(µ). Similarly it can be shown that x increases and y decreases. As a
result, mA(z) (and hence D(z)) decreases at each z, and the equilibrium value of z decreases.
{ 17 {distribution of talent across ¯rms is more concentrated for younger cohorts of workers than
it is for older cohorts.
So far we have only considered the e®ect of across-the-board changes in ®, but in reality
organization policies are often not coordinated. Thus it is interesting to examine the e®ects
of relative changes in ®. Consider an increase in ®B, the weight on relative ranking in the
lower quality organization, while ®A remains unchanged. This makes organization B more
attractive for all agents. In order to isolate the e®ect on equilibrium sorting arising from
changes in B that alter the trade-o® between the pecking order e®ect and the peer e®ect
in B, from the e®ect arising from changes that make B universally more attractive, we
look at a \compensated" change in ®B. To do so, we assume that the utility for type µ
from each organization i = A;B is







Under this formulation, an increase in ®B means that all agents in organization B ranked
above the median become better o® while those ranked below are made worse o®.13 For
example, a compensated increase in ®B occurs if organization B adopts a more meritocratic
personnel policy without increasing the overall level of compensation to its employees.
When ®A 6= ®B, we can still apply a similar argument as in Lemma 1 to show that
the support sets of the two organizations are still intervals. However, in equilibrium one
interval may strictly contain the other one. To see this, assume ®A > ®B without loss of
generality. The highest type, µ, prefers A to B if
1
2
(®A ¡ ®B) + z > 0;




(®A ¡ ®B) + z < 0:
13 For simplicity we choose the median as the reference rank. From the following analysis we can see
that the choice of the reference does not a®ect the mixing of types. Further, when ®A = ®B, the reference
rank does not a®ect the range of mixing either. Thus the equilibrium under equation (9) is the same as
the equilibrium under equation (1) when ®A = ®B.
{ 18 {Thus, if in equilibrium the quality di®erence z is between ¡1
2(®A ¡ ®B) and 1
2(®A ¡ ®B),
the very high types will all choose A, while the very low types are forced to stay with A,14
giving rise to a generalized form of overlapping intervals.
We restrict our attention to comparative static analysis of the partially overlapping
interval equilibria. Starting from one such equilibrium with z > 0, when ®B increases, there
is a stronger incentive for the threshold type x to switch from A to B. This tends to increase
x, resulting in a decrease in z. We refer to this negative e®ect on the quality di®erence as
the \threshold e®ect." When ®B increases, there is also an \allocation e®ect" on the quality
di®erence, which is positive. To see this, note that for types µ 2 [y;x] to be indi®erent
between the two organizations, we must have a constant di®erence ®AHA(µ) ¡ ®BHB(µ).
This implies a mixing rule of a fraction ®B=(®A + ®B) of each type µ going to A and the
rest going to B. Thus, an increase in ®B reduces the fraction of types in [y;x] allocated
to organization B. This tends to reduce B's average quality (for ¯xed thresholds x and
y). The following proposition provides a su±cient condition for the threshold e®ect to
dominate the allocation e®ect, and therefore for an increase in ®B to narrow the degree of
segregation between organizations A and B.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the density function f is symmetric about the median.
At a partially-overlapping equilibrium with z > 0 and ®A ¸ ®B, a compensated increase
in ®A lowers the equilibrium average quality mA of organization A, while a compensated
increase in ®B raises the equilibrium average quality mB of organization B.
The proof of this proposition is in the appendix, where we also establish a su±cient
condition on ®A and ®B for the existence of a partially-overlapping interval equilibrium.
The intuition behind this result follows from the partially-overlapping structure. Recall
that it is not a priority move for types below y to switch from organization B to A. Re-
allocating resources away from these low types toward agents higher up in the hierarchy
therefore makes organization B more attractive to agents with relatively higher ability.
14 In any priority equilibrium agents of type µ will never end up in B, which they strictly prefer.
Otherwise, the lowest type in organization A would strictly prefer to switch to B. See the proof of
Proposition 3 in the appendix for a characterization of all priority equilibria.
{ 19 {Similarly, types above x strictly prefer to stay in organization A. Reallocating resources
away from these individuals toward agents lower down in the pecking order helps orga-
nization A retain its talent. In a partially-overlapping allocation, since individuals with
intermediate levels of ability are indi®erent across organizations, competition for talent is
most intense in this segment of the market. Thus, if the objective of organizations is to
improve the overall quality of their incumbents, they should try to reallocate internal re-
sources in order to attract this speci¯c group of individuals. In a low quality organization,
people with intermediate levels of ability are relatively high in the pecking order. So a
more meritocratic approach to personnel policies that appeals to this group will enhance
the quality of the organization. In a high-quality organization, however, meritocratic per-
sonnel policies are not appealing to people with intermediate levels of ability, since they are
relatively low in the pecking order. Policies that are suitable for low quality organizations
can be counterproductive for high quality organizations.
3.2. Pre-existing di®erences in organizational attributes
So far we have assumed that the quality of an organization depends solely on the average
type of agents who choose it. But some organizations may be preferred for exogenous
reasons, such as geographical location, physical endowments, and so on. Consider therefore
a modi¯cation of the basic model in Section 2. Suppose that preferences for the low quality
organization B are instead given by
VB(µ) = ®rB(µ) + mB + ±;
where ± is a parameter representing an attribute of organization B that makes it more
appealing relative to organization A. Modifying equations (4) and (6) with the addition
of ±, we can easily see that an increase in ± raises x and reduces y, without a®ecting the






(x ¡ y) < 0:
Thus, the whole function D(z) shifts down, resulting in a smaller value of equilibrium z.
This result is stated as the following proposition.
{ 20 {Proposition 4. An increase in the preference bias for the low quality organization reduces
the extent of segregation between two organizations.
The comparative statics result remains valid when relative ranking and average quality
are not perfect substitutes in individual utility functions, as in equation (2).15 Applying
our model to school choice, we can interpret ± as the tuition charged by the high quality
school.16 Our result implies that a tuition increase by the high quality school reduces
the extent of segregation by ability. Similarly, the parameter ± can be interpreted as the
pay di®erential across organizations. For example, if wages are more compressed across
law schools than they are across law ¯rms, we would expect to see a greater degree of
segregation by ability among law professors than among attorneys in the private sector.
Di®erent agents may not value the other organizational attributes in the same way.
For example, agents typically have di®erent locational preferences. Let us consider a model
where the utility of a type µ agent from choosing organization B is given by
(10) VB(µ) = ®rB(µ) + mB + ¾±;
where ¾ is a positive parameter representing the degree of heterogeneity in tastes, and ± is
a random variable distributed according to G, with support [±;±] and a continuous density
function. For simplicity, we consider the case where the median of the distribution G is
zero, so that there is no aggregate bias for either organization.
Under equation (10), the equilibrium allocation takes the form of a generalized version
of overlapping interval structures. When ¾ is relatively large, then the highest type agents
will be present in both organizations. In particular, if ¾± < ¹
e ¡ ¹e and ¾± > ¹e ¡ ¹
e,
the equilibrium allocation will not involve high type agents choosing exclusively the high
15 With the preference bias ± for organization B, the equations that determine the threshold types
become v(F(x)¡1;mA) = v(1;mB +±) and v(0;mA) = v(F(y);mB +±). Since v is an increasing function
of m, an increase in ± raises x and reduces y. Moreover, the indi®erence condition for a type µ 2 (y;x) at
a stable equilibrium with allocation (HA;HB) becomes v(HA(µ);mA) = v(HB(µ);mB + ±). An increase
in ± makes organization B more attractive for µ. To restore the indi®erence, we need to increase HA(µ)
and decrease HB(µ). As a result, D(z) decreases pointwise and the equilibrium value of z decreases.
16 In Section 5 we consider the individual utility function (3) with side transfers and de¯ne competitive
equilibrium in which agents bid for positions of di®erent ranking in organizations. The price schedules
in a competitive equilibrium are type-independent. The parameter ± introduced here (multiplied by the
function l) may be interpreted as type-dependent tuition charges or wages.
{ 21 {quality organization. More generally, for each type µ, the fraction of agents choosing
the high quality organization A increases in the quality di®erence z and decreases in
the ranking di®erence rB(µ) ¡ rA(µ). In the appendix, we show how to characterize the
priority equilibrium in this model, and establish the following result regarding the degree
of heterogeneity in the idiosyncratic preferences for other organizational attributes.
Proposition 5. At a stable equilibrium, the degree of segregation decreases (z decreases)
as the degree of heterogeneity in the idiosyncratic preferences increases (¾ increases).
The logic of the above result is that a greater degree of heterogeneity in the idiosyn-
cratic preferences reduces the importance of the trade-o® between average quality and
relative ranking to agents' organizational choices. For any quality di®erence z there are
more agents who prefer the low quality organization B for idiosyncratic reasons as ¾ in-
creases. The equilibrium quality di®erence shrinks as a result.
The above result has an interesting implication for the design of bene¯t packages for
organizations. Suppose an organization can choose between raising salaries by some total
amount or providing in-kind bene¯ts that cost the same amount. Suppose that di®erent
employees value the in-kind bene¯ts di®erently. Then, our analysis suggests that the in-
kind bene¯ts are more e®ective for the lower quality organization to attract talent, whereas
cash wages are more e®ective for the higher quality organization to retain talent. Again,
the intuition for this result follows from the overlapping interval allocation. Top talents in
organization A strictly prefer staying in A to moving to B under given cash wages. When
the form of compensation switches to in-kind bene¯ts, some of these top talents become
better o® because the bene¯ts are worth more than the cash wages, but these individuals
will stay in A regardless. For those who value the in-kind bene¯ts less than the cash wages,
however, they will consider moving to organization B. On balance, therefore, increasing
the variance of the value of bene¯ts hurts the high-quality organization.
4. Sorting with Transfers
In our analysis of priority equilibria in the previous sections, agents with priority moves
choose which organization to join but not their relative ranking in an organization. To
{ 22 {consider the welfare implications of priority equilibrium, imagine that each rank in an
organization corresponds to a \position," with higher ranks corresponding to higher po-
sitions. Then no two agents can swap positions and be both better o®, whether the two
agents belong to the same organization or two di®erent ones. This e±ciency result, how-
ever, is too weak, as it is true for all feasible allocations. To better understand sorting
e±ciency in an environment with peer e®ect and pecking order e®ect, we consider a model
with transferable utility in this section. The utility function Vi(µ) = ®ri + mi is clearly
inadequate for our purposes, because it would imply that aggregate utility is the same for
any allocation. We therefore resort to the more general formulation of equation (3).
We may justify equation (3) by a model where in each ¯rm workers need to be matched
with tasks, and complementarity exists between the skill of a worker and the productivity
of a task. Imagine that two ¯rms, A and B, need to each hire a unit mass of workers. In
each ¯rm, there is a continuum of tasks and each employed worker must be matched with
a task. Tasks di®er by the level of capital investment ki in each ¯rm i, i = A;B. The
productivity of task ki is ®ki +mi, where mi is the average skill level of workers in i. The
output of a worker with skill level µ matched with task ki is given by
(11) l(µ)(®ki + mi):
When the level of capital investment ki is uniformly distributed, we can assume without
loss of generality ki 2 [0;1] and identify a task with capital investment ki as a position of
rank ki. Then this production function (11) provides a rationale for the individual utility
function in equation (3). We note that a critical property of the production function is
the multiplicative separable form of the complementarity between the skill of the worker
and the productivity of the task. As we have seen in the analysis of priority equilibrium,
the separability property implies type-independent trade-o® between relative ranking and
average quality, and allows us to establish the overlapping interval form for any priority
equilibrium. In this section, this property will again prove critical for providing a compet-
itive equilibrium foundation for priority equilibrium and for our discussion of the welfare
properties of priority equilibrium.
In this section, we assume that the preference function of each agent is quasi-linear,
given by the di®erence between the agent's utility (equation 3) and the agent's payment.
{ 23 {As remarked earlier, unlike in previous analysis, ri in equation (3) is now a choice variable
that ranges from 0 to 1. To avoid confusion, we refer to ri as the level of a position, and
use Hi(µ) as the quantile ranking of type µ in organization i. We call a feasible allocation
of agents between the two organizations and a pairwise matching of agents with positions
in each organization as an assignment. We consider both the competitive equilibrium
assignment and the e±cient assignment.
4.1. Competitive sorting
We de¯ne a competitive equilibrium as an assignment together with two price schedules for
positions, such that each agent chooses an organization and a position in the organization
to maximize his utility, and markets clear with each agent getting exactly one position.
Formally, let pi(ri) be the price of position level ri in organization i, i = A;B. We have
the following de¯nition.
Definition 3. A competitive equilibrium assignment is a feasible allocation (HA;HB) and
price schedules pA and pB, such that (a) if type µ is in the support set of Hi, i = A;B, then
i and Hi(µ) solves maxj=A;B
©
maxrj l(µ)(®rj + mj) ¡ pj(rj))
ª
; and (b) mi =
R µ
µ t dHi(t).
The above de¯nition implicitly assumes that in any competitive equilibrium assign-
ment higher types are matched to higher positions in each organization. As a result,
the market clearing condition is automatically satis¯ed. When l(µ) is strictly increasing,
the positive assortative matching of types to positions is implied by individual optimiza-
tion and market clearing, since for any two positions ri > ~ ri in organization i, if a type
weakly prefers ri to ~ ri then any higher type strictly prefers ri to ~ ri. When l(µ) is not
strictly increasing, for any competitive equilibrium assignment in which some lower types
are matched with higher positions in organization i, there exists another competitive as-
signment in which positions ri and agent types µ are matched according to ri = Hi(µ).
In fact, when l is constant, say l(µ) = ¸ for all µ, any allocation can be supported as a
competitive equilibrium assignment by price schedules pi(ri) = ¸(®ri + mi). All agents
are indi®erent among all positions in the two organizations. For the rest of this subsection
we assume that l is strictly increasing.
{ 24 {We argue that any priority equilibrium allocation can be supported as a competitive
equilibrium assignment. For the following proposition, suppose that (HA;HB) is a priority
equilibrium, with threshold types x and y. Without loss of generality, we assume that
mA ¸ mB. Then, the equilibrium ranking HA(µ) of any type µ in A satis¯es equation (7),
with the equilibrium ranking of µ in B given by HB(µ) = F(µ) ¡ HA(µ). The following
proposition constructs price schedules and veri¯es that De¯nition 3 is satis¯ed.
Proposition 6. Any priority equilibrium allocation can be supported as a competitive
equilibrium assignment.
Proof. For each organization i = A;B and each position ri 2 [0;1], let the price schedule









up to an integration constant to be determined below. Then, for any type µ 2 Ti, the
¯rst order condition of the optimization problem maxri l(µ)(®ri + mi) ¡ pi(ri) is satis¯ed
at ri = Hi(µ). Since pi is convex by construction, the second order condition of the
above optimization problem is satis¯ed. Thus, it is optimal for type µ 2 Ti to choose
the position of rank Hi(µ) among all positions in i. The implied indirect utility of µ is
Ui(µ) = l(µ)(®Hi(µ) + mi) ¡ pi(Hi(µ)), implying that
(12) U0
i(µ) = l0(µ)(®Hi(µ) + mi):
Given any pA(0) and pB(0), the indirect utility functions UA(µ) (for µ 2 [y;µ]) and
UB(µ) (for µ 2 [µ;x]) are thus well-de¯ned and continuously di®erentiable. Choose pA(0)
and pB(0) such that UA(y) = UB(y), and UB(µ) ¸ 0. Since (HA;HB) is a priority
equilibrium, equation (6) is satis¯ed, and so it follows from equation (12) that UA(µ) =
UB(µ) for all µ 2 [y;x].
It remains to argue that no type µ in Ti but not Tj will deviate from i to j. Consider
some type µ > x in A. The deviation utility ~ UB(µ) of this type in organization B is
maximized at rB = 1. This is because ~ UB(µ) is concave, and its derivative evaluated at
rB = 1 has the same sign as ®(l(µ)¡l(x)), which is positive. To show that type µ will not
deviate to rB = 1, we need
UA(µ) > l(µ)(® + mB) ¡ pB(1):
{ 25 {The above holds because by construction UA(x) = l(x)(® + mB) ¡ pB(1), and U0
A(µ) =
l0(µ)(®HA(µ) + mA), which is strictly greater than l0(µ)(® + mB). The argument for why
it is not optimal for type µ < y to deviate from B to A is similar. Q.E.D.
The reverse of Proposition 6 is also true. Only priority equilibrium allocations can be
supported as competitive equilibrium assignments. The next proposition ¯rst shows that
in any competitive equilibrium assignment the two support sets TA and TB are intervals.
Then, using the condition that types allocated to both organizations are indi®erent, we
show that these types must be evenly split between the two organizations. Since any
competitive equilibrium assignment must satisfy the condition that the average type in each
organization taken as given by each agent is precisely the average type that results from
the organization choices of all agents (condition (b) in De¯nition 3), the support sets in the
competitive equilibrium assignment must be overlapping intervals and the corresponding
allocation is a priority equilibrium allocation.
Proposition 7. A feasible allocation can be supported as a competitive equilibrium
assignment only if it is a priority equilibrium.
Proof. Let (HA;HB) be a feasible allocation and suppose that (HA;HB) can be sup-
ported by a competitive equilibrium assignment, with price schedules pA and pB. Note
that in any competitive equilibrium assignment each price schedule pi, i = A;B, is con-
tinuous; otherwise, at a point of discontinuity, say ri, there would be an excess supply
for positions just above ri. To show that the two support sets are both intervals, sup-
pose without loss of generality that there is a gap in TA, with types on the interval [µ; ~ µ]
allocated to organization B and at least some types just below µ and just above ~ µ are
allocated to A. Since UB(µ) = UA(µ) by continuity, a necessary condition for the gap is
U0
B(µ) ¸ ~ U0
A(µ), where UB is the indirect utility for types between µ and ~ µ and ~ UA is the
deviation utility for the same types.17 Since each type t on the interval (µ; ~ µ) must ¯nd it
optimal to choose its equilibrium position HB(t) among all positions in B ranked between
17 Following the standard mechanism design literature (e.g. Stole, 1996), we can show that the indirect
utility functions are di®erentiable almost everywhere.
{ 26 {HB(µ) and HB(~ µ), the Envelope Theorem implies that U0
B(t) = l0(t)(®HB(t)+mB). Since
a deviating type t 2 (µ; ~ µ) can always choose the position in A corresponding to type µ,
we have ~ U0
A(t) ¸ l0(t)(®HA(µ) + mA). Thus,
l0(µ)(®HB(µ) + mB) ¸ l0(µ)(®HA(µ) + mA):
Similarly, using the deviation condition of type ~ µ, we have
l0(~ µ)(®HA(~ µ) + mA) ¸ l0(~ µ)(®HB(~ µ) + mB):
However, since HA(µ) = HA(~ µ) and HB(~ µ) > HB(µ), the above two inequalities contradict
each other, implying that there cannot be a gap in TA.
If the support sets of a competitive equilibrium assignment (HA;HB) overlap on some
interval [y;x], then we have equation (12) from individual optimization of types on the
interval within each organization i among the positions ranked between Hi(y) and Hi(x).
Since each such type µ is indi®erent between A and B, we have
®HA(µ) + mA = ®HB(µ) + mB:
The above is identical to the indi®erence conditions in a priority equilibrium (see equation
6). Thus, types on the interval [y;x] are evenly split between A and B. It then follows
from condition (b) in De¯nition 3 that (HA;HB) is a priority equilibrium. Q.E.D.
The above two propositions establish an equivalence result between the competitive
equilibrium and the priority equilibrium. This result can be extended to a model in which
relative ranking and average quality are not perfect substitutes in individual production
function. So long as the marginal rate of substitution is type-independent, as in the case
where the individual production function is given by l(µ)v(ri;mi) (where v is the same
function as in equation 2), for any priority equilibrium allocation (HA;HB), we can choose








18 This construction assumes that the ¯rst order condition is su±cient for the solution to the agent's
optimization problem. This assumption is valid if v is weakly concave in ri for all mi.
{ 27 {Conversely, for any competitive equilibrium assignment with allocation (HA;HB), the
derivative of the equilibrium indirect utility U0
i(µ) must be given by l0(µ)v(Hi(µ);mi).
Then, following the same steps as in Propositions 6 and 7, we can establish the correspon-
dence between priority equilibrium allocations and competitive equilibrium assignments.
Propositions 6 and 7 provide a foundation for the priority equilibrium de¯ned in Sec-
tion 2. The driving force is the complementarity between the type of the agent and the
relative position in the organization. When transfers are allowed and agents bid competi-
tively for positions, this complementarity allows higher type agents to outbid lower types,
and hence justi¯es our intuitive concepts of priority move and priority equilibrium when
transfers are not allowed.
4.2. E±cient sorting
Since transfers are allowed, it is natural to consider a planner's problem of choosing an
assignment of types to organizations and positions to maximize aggregate utility. We refer
to the solution to the planner's problem as the e±cient assignment.
Given any allocation, the total utility of each organization is always maximized by
matching positions and agent types positive assortatively, as the average type mi is ¯xed,
and complementarity exists between the type of agent and the level of position when l is
an increasing function. Thus, for any feasible allocation (HA;HB), type µ will be matched
to position rA = HA(µ) in organization A and the maximal total utility in A is












Aggregate utility in the two organizations is Q(HA) + Q(HB), where HB = F ¡ HA.
If l is constant, any assignment is e±cient. If l is strictly increasing, the e±cient
assignment can be easily characterized for extreme values of ®. In particular when ® is
su±ciently small, perfect segregation is e±cient. This is because only the second term of
equation (13) matters, and the e±cient assignment maximizes
mAlA + (2¹ ¡ mA)(2¸ ¡ lA);
{ 28 {where mA and lA are, respectively, the average type and the average value of l(µ) in A, and
¸ is the population average of l(µ). The above is maximized when mA and lA both assume
the largest or both assume the smallest possible values. Since l is an increasing function,
this obtains when agents are perfectly segregated. In contrast, when ® is su±ciently large,
perfect mixing is e±cient. In this case the e±cient assignment maximizes
Z µ
µ
l(µ)(HA(µ) dHA(µ) + HB(µ) dHB(µ)):











Since HA + HB = F, the above is minimized point-wise when HA(µ) = HB(µ) for all µ.
For intermediate values of ® a characterization of the e±cient assignment is di±cult
without any restriction on l. In the remainder of this subsection we assume that l is linear,
and equal to µ without loss of generality. With this linearity assumption, the following
lemma provides a necessary condition for e±cient assignments.
Lemma 2. Let (HA;HB) be an e±cient assignment. If for some ² > 0 and some type µ,
Hi is strictly increasing on (µ;µ + ²) and Hj is strictly increasing on (µ ¡ ²;µ), then
(14) ®(Hj(µ) ¡ Hi(µ)) · 2(mi ¡ mj):
The proof of the lemma is in the appendix. In the proof, we use a local variation
argument to show that if equation (14) does not hold then aggregate utility can be raised
by perfectly segregating types around µ and placing types just higher than µ exclusively
in organization j and those just lower than µ exclusively in organization i. When types in
an interval are allocated to both organizations in the e±cient assignment, condition (14)
holds with equality. Thus, all types on the interval have the same di®erence in ranking
between the two organizations, implying an even split whenever mixing occurs.19 Using
Lemma 2, we obtain the following characterization result of the e±cient assignment.
19 This result relies on the linearity assumption on l. The general condition for any µ in a mixing interval
is given by ®(HB(µ)¡HA(µ)) = (mA¡mB)+(lA¡lB)=l0(µ): Comparing this to the corresponding equation
(6), due to the generally nonlinear externality term (lA ¡ lB)=l0(µ), we ¯nd that the splitting rule for the
e±cient assignment di®ers from the splitting rule in a priority equilibrium.
{ 29 {Proposition 8. Any e±cient assignment takes the overlapping interval form with an even
split of types allocated to both organizations.
Proof. We claim that the support set of each organization is an interval in the e±cient
assignment. To see this, suppose there is a gap in TA. Then, there exist two types µ and
~ µ, with µ < ~ µ, such that all types between µ and ~ µ are allocated to B, and at least some
types just below µ and just above ~ µ are allocated to A. Then, Lemma 2 implies that
®(HB(µ) ¡ HA(µ)) ¸ 2(mA ¡ mB);
®(HB(~ µ) ¡ HA(~ µ)) · 2(mA ¡ mB):
These two inequalities contradict each other, because HA(µ) = HA(~ µ) and HB(µ) < HB(~ µ).
The proposition follows immediately, since by Lemma 2 types that are allocated to both
organizations must be evenly split, and a unit mass of agents must be allocated to each
organization. Q.E.D.
Without the assumption that relative ranking and average quality are perfect sub-
stitutes in individual utility function, we no longer have the result that types that are
allocated to both organizations are evenly split in any e±cient assignment. However,
as long as the marginal rate of substitution between relative ranking and average qual-
ity is type-independent, as in the case when the individual utility function is given by
µv(ri;mi) ¡ pi(ri) (where v is the same function as in equation 2), the support sets in
any e±cient assignment remain intervals.20 Thus, the no-gap result is a robust feature of
e±ciency, as is true in both priority equilibrium and competitive equilibrium assignment.
20 Suppose that in some e±cient assignment types between µ and ~ µ are allocated exclusively to orga-
nization B, and at least some types just below µ and types just above ~ µ are allocated to A. By using a
similar local variation argument as in Lemma 2, we can show that it is necessary that






















This is a contradiction because HA(µ) = HA(~ µ) and HB(µ) < HB(~ µ).
{ 30 {By Proposition 8, the e±cient assignment can be characterized by just one variable
x; the highest type agent that participates in the low average type organization. Without
loss of generality, let the two support sets of the e±cient assignment be TA = [y;µ] and
TB = [µ;x]. Given x, the allocations are given by equation (7) and HB(µ) = F(µ)¡HA(µ),
where y depends on x through the capacity constraint of A
2 ¡ F(x) +
1
2
(F(x) ¡ F(y)) = 1;


















µ(F(µ) ¡ HA(µ))f(µ) dµ +
Z x
y






µ t dHA(t) and mB = 2¹¡mA are functions of x. Using this expression we
proceed to characterize the e±cient assignment.
Proposition 9. There exists a unique threshold type that maximizes Q(x), given by (a)
x = µe (perfect segregation) if ® · 2(¹e ¡ ¹
e), (b) x 2 (µe;µ) (partial overlapping) if
2(¹e ¡ ¹
e) < ® < 2(µ ¡ µ), and (c) x = µ (perfect mixing) if ® ¸ 2(µ ¡ µ).




f(x)(x ¡ y)(®(2 ¡ F(x)) ¡ 2(mA ¡ mB)):
For x 2 (µe;µ), we have x > y from equation (5), and thus the sign of Q0(x) is the same as
(15) q(x) ´ ®(2 ¡ F(x)) ¡ 2(mA ¡ mB):
Taking derivatives, we have
q0(x) = f(x)(2(x ¡ y) ¡ ®):
Note that q0(µe) < 0 and q(µ) = 0. Since y is a decreasing function of x by equation (5), we
have that q0(x) can change sign only once and can only change from negative to positive.
{ 31 {There are three cases. (a) If ® · 2(¹e ¡ ¹
e), then q(µe) · 0. Since q0(x) is single-crossing
from below and since q(µ) = 0, we have q(x) < 0 all x 2 (µe;µ). It follows that Q(x) is
decreasing for all x, and is thus maximized at x = µe. (b) If ® 2 (2(¹e ¡ ¹
e);2(µ ¡ µ)),
then q(µe) > 0 and q0(µ) > 0. There is a unique x 2 (µe;µ) that solves q(x) = 0, and hence
maximizes Q(x). (c) If ® ¸ 2(µ ¡ µ), then q(µe) > 0 and q0(µ) · 0. We have q(x) > 0 for
all x 2 (µe;µ), and thus Q(x) is maximized at x = µ. Q.E.D.
It is instructive to compare the above result to Proposition 1. There is more seg-
regation in the e±cient assignment than in the priority equilibrium (or the competitive
equilibrium). More precisely, we contrast the sign of Q0(x) in equation (15) with the
indi®erence condition for type x in equations (4). When ® is such that the priority equilib-
rium allocation takes the partially-overlapping form (case (b) in Propositions 1), we have
Q0(x) < 0 at the equilibrium threshold x, and therefore aggregate utility can be raised
by lowering the threshold type.21 Indeed, the threshold type in the e±cient assignment is
the same as the equilibrium threshold type with the weight ® on the pecking order e®ect
reduced by one half.
The ine±ciency of the priority equilibrium can be understood as follows. In a priority
equilibrium, agents choose organizations based on their individual utility, without any
regard for the external e®ects of their decisions on the utility of other agents. Therefore,
types that are allocated to both organizations in equilibrium must be indi®erent (see
equations 4 and 6). In particular, the equilibrium threshold x is the highest type that
weakly prefers the lower average type organization. In contrast, at the e±cient assignment
with an interior threshold type, Q0(x) = 0 (equation 15) implies
®(2 ¡ F(x)) > mA ¡ mB;
so that the threshold type x strictly prefers B, the lower average type organization. The
e±cient assignment requires a lower threshold type x, and hence less mixing, because of
21 The same conclusion holds even if l is nonlinear, although we have noted earlier that the e±cient
assignment need not be of overlapping interval form with an even split. In this case, the derivative of
aggregate utility with respect to x has the same sign as ®(2 ¡ F(x)) ¡ (mA ¡ mB) ¡ (lA ¡ lB)(x ¡
y)=(l(x) ¡ l(y)). Since HA ¯rst order stochastically dominates HB in any overlapping interval allocation,
we have lA > lB. It then follows from equation (4) that reducing the threshold type x at a priority
equilibrium increases aggregate utility.
{ 32 {the need to internalize the externalities. When the threshold x is increased and some
agents of types around x are reallocated from the higher average type organization A to
B, it may appear that two kinds of externalities on other agents need to be internalized
to maximize aggregate utility. One is that the agents with types between y and x now
take on higher level positions in organization A and lower level positions in organization B
(while those with types above x and below y keep their positions in the two organizations).
This externality is not responsible for the discrepancy between the competitive assignment
and the e±cient assignment, because the utility gain of each type in A exactly cancels
the utility loss of the same type in B. The other externality is that the average type in
organization A is decreased while the average type in B is increased, making all agents in A
worse o® and all agents in B better o®. This is the externality that fails to be internalized
in a priority equilibrium when agents with types around x move from A to B. Due to the
complementarity between agent type and the average quality in an organization, agents of
the threshold type x must be discouraged from such a move to maximize aggregate welfare.
5. Conclusion
We have presented a sorting model with heterogeneous types where the equilibrium al-
location of agents to organizations is determined by agents' concerns for average quality
comparisons across organizations and for their relative ranking within the organizations.
Sorting of agents is shown to result in an overlapping interval structure in the type space
that allows coexistence of segregation and mixing. This result enables us to easily charac-
terize the degree of segregation (measured by mean quality di®erence) across organizations.
We show that a greater emphasis on relative ranking within organizations leads to less seg-
regation across organizations. Moreover, because agents with intermediate ability are the
most mobile across organizations, personnel policies that cater to this group (i.e., the low
status members in high-quality organizations, and the high-status members in low-quality
organizations) are particularly e®ective for raising the average quality of the organization.
The concept of priority equilibrium introduced in this paper is appropriate when side
payments are not possible so that sorting is primarily determined by the quality of agents.
{ 33 {When transfers are possible, a more detailed speci¯cation of the production technology is
necessary for analysis. We construct a model of endogenous task allocation with comple-
mentarity between agents and task as well as complementarity among agents in the same
organization. In such an environment, the competitive equilibrium in which people bid
for tasks in organizations corresponds precisely to our stable priority equilibrium. The
e±cient sorting of agents to organizations in this environment also takes the form of an
overlapping interval allocation, but e±ciency requires a greater degree of segregation than
in the priority (or competitive) equilibrium. We caution, however, that our welfare results
follow from our assumptions about production externalities. Alternative speci¯cations of
preferences and technologies that bring about the peer e®ect and the pecking order e®ect
can lead to di®erent welfare conclusions.
The main limitations of the present paper are the assumptions of capacity constraints
and one-dimensional characteristics, and the absence of objective functions for organi-
zations. Each of the three is worth further investigation. The assumption of capacity
constraints may be pro¯tably replaced by participation constraints on the side of agents or
the side of organizations. The assumption of one-dimensional characteristics is standard
in the sorting literature, but needs to be relaxed to enhance the applicability of our model.
Finally, modeling the objective functions and strategies of organizations can further our
understanding of equilibrium distribution of talents among organizations. Extension of
the present model in these directions is beyond the scope of this paper, but the model
presented here can prove fruitful in investigating these issues in sorting.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. First, we provide a characterization of stable priority equi-
librium. Without loss of generality assume ®A ¸ ®B. We allow z to range from ¹
e ¡ ¹e
to ¹e ¡ ¹
e]. For any such z, we can determine the support sets TA and TB, as follows.
Suppose for now 1
2(®A ¡®B) < ¹e ¡¹
e: For any z > 1
2(®A ¡®B), we have TA = [y;µ] and





















+ z = 0:
{ 34 {For z between ¡1
2(®A ¡ ®B) and 1
2(®A ¡ ®B); we have TA = [µ;µ] and TB = [y;x]; where
x and y solve
®A
µ

















®B + z = 0:
Finally, for z < ¡1



















®B + z = 0:
If 1
2(®A ¡ ®B) ¸ ¹e ¡ ¹
e; then only the second case arises. In each of the three cases the
resulting quality di®erence D(z) is given by 2(mA(z) ¡ ¹); where mA(z) is the average
quality in organization A using the corresponding thresholds and the mixing rule of a
fraction ®B=(®A+®B) of each type in [y;x] going to A and the rest going to B. As before,
a stable priority equilibrium is then a z such that D(z) = z and D0(z) < 1.
Next, we provide a su±cient condition for the existence of a partially-overlapping
stable priority equilibrium with z > 0 when ®A > ®B. Start with ®A = ®B = ®: We argue
that if ® is between 2(¹e ¡ ¹) and 2(µ ¡ ¹); then an overlapping equilibrium with z > 0
exists when ®A marginally increases or ®B decreases marginally. To see this, note that
D(z) < z at z = ¹e ¡¹
e; because ®A;®B > 2(¹e ¡¹) implies x > µe by equation (16). At
z = 1























2(®A¡®B) because ® < 2(µ¡¹): Thus there exists at least one stable
equilibrium with partial overlapping.
Finally, for comparative statics when ®A ¸ ®B, note that at any stable priority







































(F(t) ¡ F(µe)) dt:
We know that at z = 1
2(®A ¡ ®B), the threshold types satisfy F(^ x) = 1 + ®B=®A and
F(^ y) = 0: At any partially-overlapping interval equilibrium with z > 0, we have x < ^ x, and
hence the bracketed term in (17) is less than F(^ x)¡2+ 1
2(®A¡®B)=®A · 0. Furthermore,
(16) and the symmetry of f imply that x ¡ µe · µe ¡ y when ®A ¸ ®B. Therefore, the
integral in (17) is also negative. We thus have dz=d®A < 0 when ®A > ®B. Similar
calculations show that dz=d®B > 0 under the same conditions. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. Without loss of generality, assume mA ¸ mB. The per-
missible range of z is [0;¹e ¡ ¹
e]. If ¾± < ¹
e ¡ ¹e and ¾± > ¹e ¡ ¹
e, a positive fraction,
G(z=¾); of the highest type agents will choose A and the rest will choose B: When z > ¾±
all agents of the highest type µ will choose A.
Let HA(µ) be the type distribution function in organization A: Then for any µ < µ,












The above is a di®erential equation in HA, with the boundary condition HA(µ) = 1. (A
unique solution to the di®erential equation (18) exists. See, for example, Verhulst (1996).)
Let HA(µ;z) be the solution to the di®erential equation. We assume that the solution
satis¯es the capacity constraint of A; otherwise if the solution is negative for some µ,
rede¯ne HA(µ;z) as 0. (Note that the solution to the di®erential equation cannot exceed
F(µ) at any µ, hence the capacity constraint of B is never violated.)
We have thus established that for any given z, there is a unique allocation of types
between the two organizations consistent with the quality gap z. As before, an equilibrium
{ 36 {with z is de¯ned by D(z) = z, and the equilibrium is stable if D0(z) < 1. Note that
D(0) = 0 because H0
A(µ) = 1
2f(µ) and therefore the solution to the di®erential equation
(18) is given by HA(µ;0) = 1
2F(µ) for all µ. At the other end, we have D(¹e¡¹
e) · ¹e¡¹
e,
with strict inequality if and only if ¾± > ¹e¡¹
e. Thus, a stable priority equilibrium always
exists.
Now we prove the comparative statics result with respect to ¾. We can show that an
increase in ¾ shifts HA(µ;z) downward in the sense that HA(µ;z) is ordered by ¯rst order
stochastic dominance for any z 2 (0;¹e ¡ ¹
e). To establish this claim, ¯rst note that at µ
the solution HA(µ;z) = 1 for all ¾, and the slope is smaller for the solution corresponding
to a greater ¾. Next note that no two solutions corresponding to di®erent ¾'s can cross at
any other point, since at any crossing the solution corresponding to a greater ¾ must have
a smaller slope by equation (18). An increase in ¾ then shifts down the function D. Since
D0(z) < 1 at a stable equilibrium, the quality di®erence z decreases. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. Without loss of generality assume i = B and j = A. For any
su±ciently small ² > 0; let °(²) solve
HA(µ) ¡ HA(µ ¡ °(²)) = HB(µ + ²) ¡ HB(µ):
Since HB is strictly increasing just above µ and HA is strictly increasing just below µ, we








HA(t); if t 62 (µ ¡ °(²);µ + ²)
HA(µ ¡ °(²)); if t 2 (µ ¡ °(²);µ)
HA(µ ¡ °(²)) + F(t) ¡ F(µ); if t 2 [µ;µ + ²)
and H²
B = F ¡ H²
A. The assignment (H²
A;H²
B) modi¯es (HA;HB) by redistributing all
agents of type on the interval (µ ¡ °(²);µ) to organization B and all types on the interval
[µ;µ + ²) to organization A. Let ¢(²) be the di®erence in aggregate output between
{ 37 {(H²
A;H²









































Evaluating ¢(²) and its ¯rst two derivative at ² = 0 we have ¢(0) = ¢0(0) = 0 while
¢00(0) is proportional to ®(HA(µ)¡HB(µ))¡2(mB ¡mA): Thus, if ®(HA(µ)¡HB(µ)) >
2(mB ¡ mA), it is possible to increase aggregate utility by redistributing agents of type
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